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Chapter 5: The Genealogy of Self
Contradiction, then, functions throughout discourse, as the principle of its his-
toricity. 1
Michel Foucault writes that the »history of ideas recognizes […] two 
levels of contradictions: that of appearances, which is resolved in the 
profound unity of discourse; and that of foundations, which give rise to 
discourse itself.« Foucault argues that despite attempts to reconcile these 
discrepancies, »contradiction is ceaselessly reborn through discourse«.2
Up to now, engaging with contradictions of the first kind has served as a 
tool for situating the encounter between Nietzsche and Strindberg his-
torically as a series of collisions within seemingly paradoxical positions. 
 These particular collisions arose due to a certain historical under-
standing; as the awareness of being a modern human being in the flow of 
time inflected the attempts of intellectuals to understand how they could 
either posit enduring forms or learn to affirm constant change in what 
they understood to be an increasingly contingent world. Strindberg’s 
reception of Nietzsche was epitomized by contradictory claims and the 
discourse around the encounter between the two tended to smooth out 
the differences. As a result, the richness of the moment was relegated to 
the marginalia of literary history and the philosophical import of the 
encounter was written off as Strindberg’s strong misreading of Nietzsche. 
More importantly than any claim of influence, the encounter revealed a 
certain post-positivist epistemological uncertainty where the drive to 
learn and to receive recognition from the other was expressed through 
tropes of appropriation and anticipation. Both Nietzsche and Strindberg 
inform us of a vivid conception of the relationship between descriptions 
of the world and of the self in late nineteenth century Europe. 
 Even though both men rejected teleological explanations of progres-
sive historical change, the encounter was marked by a temporal dis-
placement intrinsic to certain strains of modernity, namely the feeling 
that the past is irretrievable and the present is always pregnant with the 
future. This particular understanding of temporality had a profound effect 
————
1  FOUCAULT: 1972, 151
2  Ibid.  
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on Nietzsche and Strindberg’s conceptions of how narrative of the self 
could be told; for if the »I« is a historical construction and history has no 
telos, then how could one claim essential or enduring qualities without 
reverting to trans-historical spiritual or materialist claims? In the 1880’s,
both Nietzsche and Strindberg took recourse in a middle position, believ-
ing that modernity was a moment where the anticipation of change was 
confronted by the claim of the proper name; as naming and description 
themselves served as forms of appropriation in a contentious public cul-
ture. Their belief in the ability of discourse to temporarily place the stamp 
of being on becoming was often misread by their contemporaries, as often 
as not, in a rather ahistorical fashion. 
 The consequent rise of the trope of authenticity in the discourse 
around the Nietzsche reception in Scandinavia created a tension between 
the »good European« as a trans-national »aristocratic radical« who an-
ticipates a future free from the parochial confines of the strong nation 
state and the ambiguous particularity of the national or racial type who 
re-constructs an authentic future out of a self-consciously fictional past. 
However, despite the essentializing propensity of the discourse around 
him, Nietzsche understood his own existence as being suffused with his-
tory:
Wohin man reisen muss. – Die unmittelbare Selbstbeobachtung reicht nicht 
lange aus, um sich kennen zu lernen: wir brauchen Geschichte, denn die Ver-
gangenheit strömt in hundert Wellen in uns fort; wir selber sind ja Nichts als 
Das, was wir in jedem Augeblick von diesem Fortströmen empfinden. 
(Whither we have to travel. – Direct self-observation is not nearly sufficient 
for us to know ourselves: we require history, for the past continues to flow 
within us in a hundred waves; we ourselves are, indeed, nothing but that 
which at every moment we experience of this continued flowing.)3
For Nietzsche and Strindberg, the history of the self emanated from an 
engagement with internal contradictions. Therefore, Foucault’s second 
type of contradiction, that from which discourse emerges, will be the 
subject of the remainder of this book. Both Nietzsche and Strindberg 
believed that the antinomies of the modern subject bring to bear a certain 
historical sense, specifically a sense of living in a nihilistic age, where 
»die obersten Werthe sich entwerthen« (the highest values are devalu-
————
3  NIETZSCHE: KSA 2, 1988b, 2:477, Aphorism 223. The English translation comes 
from: HOLLINGDALE: 1996, 2:267–268, Aphorism 223.
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ated).4 Both men understood themselves to be living in a moment when 
they needed to »[d]em Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen« 
(imprint upon becoming the character of being)5 and they understood 
that »[w]enn kein Zeil in der ganzen Geschichte der menschlichen 
Geschicke liegt, so müssen wir eins hineinstecken« ([i]f there is no goal 
in the history of man’s lot, then we must put one in).6
 Nietzsche’s genealogical method, which according to Eric Blondel 
utilizes »the language of the life of the body,«7 serves as a point of entry 
into our discussion of the contradictions that belie the claims for the 
autonomous individual. For certainly the collective demand for individ-
ual self-assertion leads to the construction of one of the most uncanny 
creatures in the history of modern thought, an individual who dares not 
deny his own autonomy for fear of departing from the values of the 
crowd. This is Nietzsche’s herd animal, believing in his own individuality 
because of a universally held belief. However despite or perhaps because 
of his critique, Nietzsche realized the value of contradiction himself and 
understood it to be a defining aspect of his own modernity; his view of 
what it meant to be living in the late nineteenth Century clearly expresses 
the uncanniness of the position of the bourgeois subject. Congruently, 
one of his notebook entries from the mid 1880’s reads: 
Wenn ich einstmals das Wort »unzeitgemäß« auf meine Bücher geschrieben 
habe, wie viel Jugend, Unerfahrenheit, Winkel drückt sich in diesem Worte 
aus! Heute begreife ich, daß mit dieser Art Klage, Begeisterung und Unzufrie-
denheit ich eben damit zu den Modernsten der Modernen gehörte. 
————
4  NIETZSCHE: 1970, 14. The English translation comes from STURGE: 2003, 146, entry 9
[35]. Michael Allen Gillespie claims that »[i]n contrast to all of his predecessors from 
Jacobi to Turgenev, Nietzsche thus sees Nihilism as the consequence of human weak-
ness and not as a result of a Promethian striving for the superhuman. Indeed, for 
Nietzsche, the superhuman is not the cause of nihilism but its solution.« I will argue 
that the »Promethian« is an aspect of Nietzsche’s nihilism as well. Certainly Zarathustra 
cites Goethe’s »Prometheus Fragmente« and Robert Gooding Williams argues convinc-
ingly for Zarathustra’s Promethian aspects. I would also add that the will to power is a 
species of Promethian expansion. See GILLESPIE: 1995, 179 and GOODING-WILLIAMS:
2001, 236–268
5  NIETZSCHE: 1974b, 320, entry 7 [54]. The English translation comes from STURGE:
2003, 138.
6  NIETZSCHE: 1974b, 242, entry 6 [9] The English translation comes from STURGE:
2003, 124.
7  From Eric Blondel’s »Question of Genealogy,« collected in SCHACHT: 1994, 312.
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(If I once wrote the word »untimely« on my books, how much youth, inexpe-
rience, peculiarity that word expressed! Today I realize it was precisely this 
kind of complaint, enthusiasm, and dissatisfaction that made me one of the 
most modern of the moderns.)8
Nietzsche understood his being modern by virtue of his opposition to 
modernity. This was his way of situating himself in history and for under-
standing the role that history played in his psychology. Nietzsche’s con-
tradictory discourse historicizes yet he claims that the collision between 
internalized positions cannot be directly observed; it emerges through 
discursive and performative acts. For »[w]ir sind us unbekannt, wir Erk-
ennenden, wir selbst uns selbst: das hat seinen guten Grund« ([we] are 
unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and with good reason).9 This par-
ticular species of »ignorance« evokes ironic thoughts about the pathos of 
distance. However it becomes apparent that the taking of distance in 
order to know cannot be the entire story for one who rejects the notion 
of an absolute objectivity, and thus the pathos of distance cannot be the 
basis for a Nietzschean epistemology all on its own. Perhaps, distance 
requires a reciprocal passion, a contradiction so to speak in the form of a 
pathos of engagement. Nietzsche implied that we require a context from 
which we can know and that we desire both finitude and something 
more, an awareness of the ebb and flow of time in consciousness. 
 Henry Staten contests the idea that the inconsistencies in the 
Nietzschean project are merely the hallmark of perspectival thinking. He 
writes that while Nietzsche advocates that all knowledge is perspectival, 
he does take positions, and seeing as much, the critic must assimilate 
Nietzsche from a »psychodialectical approach,« »the dialectic between 
logic and libido«.10 Staten also centers his critique in Nietzsche’s bodies 
so to speak: in the textual corpus and in the libidinal economy that the 
text reveals. Staten’s argument is compelling and his reasoning finds some 
support in Nietzsche famous dictum that all philosophy is really the un-
conscious memoir of the body.11
 Building on this line of reasoning and factoring in Michel’s Foucault’s 
postulation that contradictions allow the principle of historicity to 
————
8  NIETZSCHE: 1974b, 162, Entry 2[201]. English translation: STURGE: 2003, 98.
9  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 247. The English translation comes from DIETHE: 2007, 3.
10  See STATEN: 1990. The first cited phrase is found on pg. 6, the second on pg. 2.
11  Ibid., 8–9. Here Staten cites Nietzsche from JBG (BGE), Aphorism 6.
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emerge in thought, one wonders how to reconstruct the contradictions in 
Nietzsche’s genealogies so that they reflect his timeliness, his modernity, 
and his moment. It is helpful to recall that Nietzsche believed himself to 
be living in »die Zeit der Tragödie, die Zeit der Moralen und Religionen« 
(the age of tragedy, in the age of moralities and religions).12 However 
despite the dominance of these aspects of the age, we must not read this 
formulation in a static manner for Nietzsche’s contradictory method is 
born from his concern for difference and relation. Gilles Deleuze reminds 
us that the »tragic is only to be found in multiplicity,«13 and from Aris-
totle on we have known that collision creates the dramatic modality of a 
tragic art. Nietzsche’s genealogical method necessarily involves descrip-
tions of colliding and contradictory moments in both the history of mo-
rality and I would argue in the history of the self. For as Nietzsche argues 
in the very aphorism that Staten uses to introduce his study of the phi-
losopher’s »psychodialectical« economy: 
Bei allem Wollen handelt es sich schlechterdings um Befehlen und Gehorchen, 
auf der Grundlage, wie gesagt, eines Gesellschaftsbaus vieler »Seelen«: wes-
halb ein Philosoph sich das Recht nehmen sollte, Wollen an sich schon unter 
den Gesichtskreis der Moral zu fassen: Moral nämlich als Lehre von den Herr-
schafts-Verhältnissen verstanden, unter denen das Phänomen »Leben« 
ensteht. 
(All willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying, on the ground-
work, as I have said, of a society constructed of many »souls«; from which a 
philosopher should claim the right to understand willing itself within the 
framework of morality: morality understood as a doctrine of power relations 
under which the phenomenon of »life« arises.)14
 For Nietzsche the sense that one has of history is related to »die 
Fähigkeit, die Rangordnung von Werthschätzungen schnell zu errathen, 
ach welchen ein Volk, eine Gesellschaft, ein Mensch lebt« (the capacity 
to divine quickly the valuations by which a society, a man lives).15 Staten 
is certainly right to take to task anyone who would simply argue that 
————
12  NIETZSCHE: 1988c, KSA 3, 370, Aphorism 1. The English comes from NAUCKHOFF:
2001, 28, Aphorism 1.
13  DELEUZE: 1983, 17; my translation.
14  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 32, Aphorism 19. The English comes from NORMAN: 2002,
20.
15  See NIETZSCHE: 1974a, 232. The English translation comes from STURGE: 2003, 17,
Entry 35 [2]. See also NIETZSCHE: 1993, 157–160, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Aphorism 
224.
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Nietzsche’s contradictions are merely a result of perspectivalism; for this 
is not only a question of specific viewpoints, but of drives, the perspec-
tives they create, and the organization of these competing perspectives 
within the organism. Nietzsche argues that »[v]on jedem unserer Grund-
triebe aus giebt es verschiedne perspektivische Abschätzung alles 
Geschehens und Erlebens« ([f]rom each of our fundamental drives there 
is a different appraisal of everything that happens and is experienced). He 
continues by adding there is »einer Vielheit von ›Willen zur Macht‹: jeder 
mit Vielheit von Ausdrucksmitteln und Formen« (a multiplicity of ›wills 
to power‹: each one with a means of expression and forms).16 He even 
posits that »der Mensch eine Vielheit von Kräften ist, welche in einer 
Rangordnung stehen« (man is a multiplicity of forces, which stand in an 
order of rank) so as to provide an internal hierarchy of command that 
enhances their existence.17 It becomes apparent that there is a strong 
processional commonality between the way one understands historically 
and the way one’s drives are organized to produce a moral sense as well. 
Seen in this light, it is easier to understand why Nietzsche critiques the 
notion of a unitary subject when he critiques morality, and why he won-
ders if perhaps history is yet to be discovered.18
 The implications in all this come to the fore when we realize that 
Nietzsche relegates the »I,« the »soul,« the »unitary« and the »free« wills 
to fictions, to composites abbreviating multiplicities.19 Self-depiction is 
both retrospective (adding the doer to the deed) and anticipatory (based 
on the noble privilege of keeping promises) in this framework, and this 
helps to explain the imperative of a notion of time that demands a circle 
of recurrence. The self derives itself through performance, through aes-
thetic reconstruction, and this is dependent on contradictions. In the 
end, I argue with Foucault that these contradictions situate Nietzsche 
historically in the moment where bourgeois subjects attack bourgeois 
————
16  NIETZSCHE: 1974b, 21. The English translation comes from: STURGE: 2003, 59–60,
Entry 1 [58].
17  NIETZSCHE: 1974a, 181, Entry 34 [123]; STURGE: 2003, 8, for the translation. 
18  See Aphorism 34, »Historia Abscondita«. NIETZSCHE: 1988c, KSA 3, 404, Die
fröhliche Wissenschaft. The English may be found in NAUCKHOFF and DEL CARO: 2001,
53–54.
19  For a compelling study of this phenomenon, see PARKES: 1994.
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suppositions. I argue that the subject emerges in the late nineteenth cen-
tury as the »contradiction ceaselessly reborn through discourse«.20
 The last chapter addressed how scholars had reconciled both the 
contradictory aspects of Strindberg’s literary production and the inconsis-
tencies in his private statements concerning his encounter with 
Nietzsche. It was my contention that the scholarship on the subject has 
been restricted by the parameters of a model of analysis based on influ-
ence, and has heretofore reconciled these contradictions in order to posit 
the impossibility of influence. I argued further that a commonality be-
tween Nietzsche and Strindberg can be found in these selfsame contra-
dictions if they are understood as part of a dynamic process of subject 
formation rather than merely a set of incongruent statements. As Steven 
E. Aschheim has pointed out, the determination of the degree of an au-
thor’s Nietzscheanism is not contingent upon his conceptual congruity to 
a Nietzschean master text. 
 Strindberg believed that Nietzsche’s penchant for contradiction made 
him the timeliest, »the most modern of us all,« and as mentioned earlier, 
he understood his palinodic philosophical production as a systemless 
system, as a process in other words. For Strindberg, the question was not 
»to be or not to be« Nietzschean, but to be both Nietzschean and not 
Nietzschean at the same time. He believed that Nietzsche had articulated 
his own way of understanding the past, as a re-collection in the moment, 
as an experimental re-enactment whose end result was a fictional sense of 
self. As we shall see, this sense of self was dependent on an agonistic 
process that included an internalization of the »truth« of contradictions.21
What Strindberg saw as Nietzsche’s systemless system, what he saw as 
the habit of opposing everything, I call the genealogy of self.
 It is from the premise of colliding genealogical possibilities that I take 
my leave of the previous scholarship on the subject and start an interro-
gation of this concept. As previously defined, the genealogy of self is a 
————
20  In the end, I will argue we live in similar times where a revival of fundamentalist 
religious views worldwide stands mostly in staunch opposition to the values of globaliz-
ing capital.
21  Wolfgang Müller-Lauter went so far as to state that »For Nietzsche, the whole of 
reality is determined from the outset by the ›struggle‹ of opposites.« While I would not 
go so far as to call the contradictory terms used by Nietzsche »opposites« (for I believe 
he posits binaries only to empty the term opposite of its meaning), I agree that the motor 
of his philosophy sets opposing terms into colliding orbits. For the source of the citation 
above see MÜLLER-LAUTER: 1999, 5.
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hermeneutic process that highlights the internalization of contradictory 
elements. It is a process of subject formation that bares its own device 
and forwards a weakened truth claim. As the genealogy of self is a dy-
namic process that highlights the »overcoming« of the past by the im-
peratives of the moment, contradiction ceases to be a problematic aspect 
and functions as the raw material for self-creation. Contradiction, then, 
marks the location where the device is bared. It conflates differentiated 
elements that are set in opposition to each other, and the force of this 
encounter is the vital element of the genealogy of self. In the genealogy
of self, the construction of the »I« is always the result of a collision be-
tween collective modes of valuation and a mode of self-description that 
highlights the establishment of an internal hierarchy created through 
struggle. The result of this struggle is the description of a subject that is in 
no way a stable »I,« but is rather an »I« in a constant state of becoming, 
an »I« aware of its own history and in anticipation of its own futuricity. 
In other words, a contingent subjectivity is constructed and decon-
structed. In this way we are alerted to the phenomenon of the bourgeois 
uncanny, the means by which the notion of the individual is collectively 
determined and given the veneer of an absolutely discrete unit of meas-
ure.
 In the encounter between Strindberg and Nietzsche, it is this very 
process that makes any attempt at a determination of influence an exer-
cise in futility. For the value of the encounter resides in its very historic-
ity, as a moment of rebellion against a notion of subjectivity upon which 
it was dependent, the false assumption of the self-creating and assertive 
individual. It is ironic that these two writers, who have often been de-
picted as exemplars of individual self-generation and whose reputation 
has been largely crafted from the material harvested from their more po-
lemical moments, both forwarded notions of individuation that high-
lighted the fictionality of the process and factored in historical 
conditions. In this sense, both Nietzsche and Strindberg performed a 
process of subject-creation that highlighted the tension between necessity 
and contingency. The genealogy of self is a site of collision between he-
redity and creativity and between history and the moment of self-
identification, which stamps being on the soft flesh of becoming in the 
flow of time. 
 It is important to note that my investigation of this concept is not 
merely a capitulation to the discourse of the environment of the reception 
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with its emphasis on the individual who either created history or was not 
subject to its conditions. While my interrogation will precipitate a re-
newed investigation of the concepts whose surfaces were traced in our 
previous investigation of the discursive environment of the reception, it 
will concentrate on the concept that remained underdeveloped in this 
discourse, namely, the concept of origin. For the salient aspect of the 
genealogy of self, the very motor that drives the process, are two opposi-
tions, the tension between naming and forgetting and the agonism be-
tween dual origins. These oppositions are evident in several moments of 
the two men’s authorship, and an investigation of these instances will 
show that neither Strindberg nor Nietzsche discounted historical condi-
tions nor did they forward a notion of authenticity based on an intrinsic 
element of origination. They shared a notion of self-construction that 
conflated historical and experiential elements in a momentary metaphori-
cal complex. In other words, in this investigation I will be concerned with 
the internalization of contradictions in a dynamic process. 
 An objection can be raised: What is the difference between what I 
have previously called the metaphysics of poeticizing the self into text 
and the textual construction of subjectivity that I call the genealogy of 
self? The difference resides in the following: the genealogy of self bares 
the device of the poeticization of self into text and it makes a weakened 
truth claim. It does not conflate man and text; it claims only the status of 
an interpretation. It posits the predicates of the proper name of the self as 
the assumption of a momentary perspective that is subject to continual 
repetition. The end result of a genealogy of self is not a claim for a stable 
subjectivity. The self is not a result of an autobiographical excavation of 
the content of experience; it is not a confirmation of the past. The gene-
alogy of self highlights a formal process, a self-referential hermeneutic, 
which is a struggle between necessity and contingency resulting in a mo-
mentary conflation of history and autobiography in a compound meta-
phor. With this in mind, I will now turn to an exploration of the 
Nietzschean genealogical method. 
Pathos of Distance, Pathos of Engagement: 
The Relationship of Genealogy and Polemic 
In chapter four, I remarked that the surface aspect of the commonality in 
Strindberg and Nietzsche’s authorial projects could be found in a means 
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN STRINDBERG AND NIETZSCHE186
of valuation whose dynamic was an oscillation between proximity and 
distance. I explained this phenomenon through a brief explication of the 
Nietzschean opposition between das Pathos der Distanz (the pathos of 
distance) and appropriation through naming.22 In this section, I will 
elaborate on this method of valuation by analyzing those Nietzschean 
texts that are most concerned with this subject: a theoretical investigation 
of what he saw as the dominant mode of valuation in the West, Zur Ge-
nealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals), and his self-
description, Ecce Homo. These two genealogies are inextricably linked as 
Nietzsche understood this dominant perspective, the ascetic ideal, to be 
an internalization of suffering and considered the praxis of his philoso-
phy to be a Selbstüberwindung (self-overcoming). His genealogical work 
re-enacted what he considered to be the struggle between this perspective 
and a noble perspective on both the level of »history« and »autobiogra-
phy«. Considering this postulation, the problem of the relativity of
Nietzsche’s perspectivalism must be addressed. For if the Nietzschean 
genealogy confronted what he saw as the dominant perspective in West-
ern culture with just another perspective, what is his truth claim? 
 Section 22 of Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil)
informs the following reading of Nietzsche’s twin genealogies. Though 
this text cannot be considered as an example of Nietzsche’s genealogical 
corpus, it provides us with a means of understanding the genealogies in 
light of their perspectivalism. In this section, Nietzsche takes the »Physi-
cists« and »bad Philologists« to task for positing the »Gesetzmässigkeit 
der Natur« (nature’s conformity to law).23 He accuses them of mistaking 
their interpretation for fact and goes on to forward a counter claim that 
nature is not subject to law, but instead expresses der Wille zur Macht in 
all of its manifestations. The section ends by admitting: 
Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur Interpretation ist – und ihr werdet eifrig genug 
sein, dies einzuwended? – nun, umso besser. –  
(Granted this too is only an interpretation – and you will be eager enough to 
raise an objection? – well, so much the better. – )24
————
22  The claim that naming appropriates is at least as old as the book of Genesis. 
23  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 37. See also HOLLINGDALE: 1990, 52 for the translation of 
the phrase. 
24  Ibid. NIETZSCHE for the original and HOLLINGDALE for the translation. 
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 Readers of Nietzsche’s genealogical works are confronted with a basic 
interpretive problem. Do we read these genealogies as historical ac-
counts, as polemics, or in a more Nietzschean sense, as a masked »auto-
biography« that calls itself a linguistic manifestation of der Wille zur 
Macht (the will to power). Nietzsche’s claim that perspective delimits 
interpretation can be easily turned against him by an unsympathetic 
reader who asserts that perspectivism undermines his critical project by 
rendering his own assertions relative to any other assertion. Nietzsche 
can be accused of either denying the very foundation upon which his 
postulations stand or of using the will to power as a metaphysical 
ground. However, an interpretation of this kind would arrest the motion, 
which characterizes the Nietzschean genealogical method. It is not that 
Nietzsche lacked a truth claim, but rather that he refrained from connect-
ing his truth claim to any static model. He stated time and time again that 
our understanding of »reality« is an interpretation in competition with 
and in relation to other interpretations. The Nietzschean genealogy ad-
mits to its perspective, but this does not negate the relevance of his claim 
for an affirmative praxis. 
 Nietzschean perspectivism does not merely admit to the existence of 
divergent points of view. It is not a passive gesture that simply acknowl-
edges a multiplicity of interpretations. His perspectivism is not relative; it 
is relational. It is not relative in the sense that interpretations exist inde-
pendently of and equal to one another. It is relational in that interpreta-
tions are an event of the will to power. »Der Wille zur Macht 
interpretiert« (The will to power interprets), and as an interpretive force, 
defines itself in relation to other interpretations.25 For Nietzsche, interpre-
tation was an event of the will to power and as such experiences »Alles 
Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Grad-
und Kraftverhältnissen, als ein Kampf« (All that happens, all movement, 
all becoming, as a determination of relations of degree and force, as a 
struggle).26
 Nietzschean interpretation collides with other interpretations in the 
world and is never a neutral activity. An interpretative perspective and 
the resulting exegesis cannot constitute a neutral ground. Within this 
————
25  NIETZSCHE: 1974b, 137, Entry 2[148].The English translation is from STURGE: 2003,
91.
26  NIETZSCHE: 1970, 49, Entry 9[91]. STURGE: 2003, 155, for the translation. 
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framework, our understanding of the world is textual, and the confluence 
of its multiple interpretations results in it being a site of collision.27 This 
collision activates a play of forces. However, not all interpretations are 
equal. »[S]chlechte Philologie« mistakes its interpretation for the text 
itself. Nietzsche’s »bad philologists« mistake their calculations for the 
world as such, and understand existence as governed by laws.28 It is to 
them that Nietzsche directs his challenge. This is the heart of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Interpretation is always met by counter-interpretations, 
memory by counter-memory, and dogma by difference.29 An interpreta-
tion seeks to »master« other interpretations. Nietzsche’s own interpreta-
tion depended upon his objections to previous interpretations and the 
objections of others to his, and so on. 30 That is not to say that this rela-
tionship is parasitic.31 A Nietzschean interpretation does not feed off 
previous interpretations, it engages with them in an oscillation between 
distance and proximity in a movement between das Pathos der Distanz
(the pathos of distance) and polemic as a pathos of engagement. »In 
Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr über etwas zu 
werden.« (In truth, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master 
of something.)32
 This mastering is not parasitic; it is parodic. It does not draw its life-
blood from the vitality of previously stated positions. It inhabits the same 
discursive space, so to speak; confronting a poem with another poem, 
colonizing or if you prefer, de-colonizing the sacred space of the western 
tradition with a counter narrative of origination. The drive to master 
occurs in three moments. The will to power is engaged within the »self,« 
with the »historical« past and with other interpretations in the world. 
————
27  This is an example of what I call »Nietzschean Modesty,« a modesty that ironically 
is dependent upon a polemical rhetorical assertion. 
28  NIETZSCHE: 1993, 37 (Jenseits von Gut und Böse).
29  See FOUCAULT: 1980.
30  As Daniel Conway puts it: »Hence a NIETZSCHEan genealogy is successful not if it 
achieves or approximates objective validity, but if it effectively supplants or discredits 
the dominant interpretation of the historical phenomenon in question.« See Conway’s 
»Genealogy and Critical Method« in SCHACHT: 1994, 324.
31  Conway feels that it is. I agree with him that Nietzsche’s discourse attempts to 
occupy the same discursive space as other interpretations, but see the modality as being 
sometimes parodic, sometimes ironic, always appropriating, and not parasitic. See ibid., 
318.
32  NIETZSCHE: 1974b, 138, Entry 2[148]. The English is from: STURGE: 2003, 90.
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The first two moments of engagement address »autobiographical« and 
»historical« concerns in order to affirm chance and becoming. This ne-
cessitates a genealogy. The third moment manifests itself in an eternal 
present tense and speaks in a polemical voice. These three moments are 
dependent on each other and do not constitute a system of discrete ele-
ments. They are aspects of a dynamic complex of forces, which engage in 
an interpretive event. They cannot be reduced to historical and autobio-
graphical elements or subject and object relations. For Nietzsche, the 
salient characteristic of his contemporary historical environment was the 
internalization of repressive elements of the ascetic ideal. He saw himself 
as a site where the contradictory elements of instinct and internalized 
history were in a state of constant struggle. These contradictory elements, 
in turn, act as the raw material for self-creation. 
 The remainder of this chapter will explore this play of forces by inves-
tigating the relationship between the genealogical elements of Zur Gene-
alogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals) and Ecce Homo and the 
polemical voice employed in both of these texts. The genealogical and 
polemical moments in these texts will be addressed discretely, in relation 
to each other, and as constituent formal elements of the three interpreta-
tive sights mentioned above. My preliminary thesis reads: Nietzsche’s
fascination with moral valuation in his later work was accompanied 
by a concern with the problem of the relationship between his histori-
cal environment and subject formation. His genealogies are not an 
attempt to reconstruct the »origin« of moral valuation, but a performa-
tive act, a negotiation between the interpretative poles of necessity and 
contingency in the act of self-construction.33
Genealogy
Meine Humanität ist eine beständige Selbstüberwindung. 
————
33  Keith Ansell Pearson writes: »Nietzsche construes the advent of nihilism as provid-
ing the occassion for a supreme act of self-examination on the part of humanity, namely 
a revaluation of all values, including a revaluation of the value of civilization.« I would 
add that this includes a self vivisection from which internalized historical elements are 
unknotted and re-organized. The source of the citation above is ANSELL-PEARSON: 1991,
44.
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(My Humanity is a constant self-overcoming).34
For Nietzsche, interpretation is the product of an internal determination, 
for »unser Leib ist ja nur ein Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen« (our body is, 
after all, only a society constructed out of many souls).35 Yet this internal 
determination is not an innate principle, it is the product of a long history 
of social interaction and reaction, a social structure of internalized rela-
tionships of active and reactive forces.36 However, the individual is not 
determined solely by this »history«. The possibility exists for him to inter-
act with history through the interpretative and symbolic aspects of con-
sciousness.37
 If Nietzsche’s representation of consciousness is metaphorical, as 
claimed by Sarah Kofman, it is because the »unsymbolisch« meaning 
which ancient man ascribed to attributes has been laden with symbolic 
meaning over time.38 In any case, the internalization of energy, which 
Nietzsche believed to form consciousness, is by no means mimetic. It is 
not a mirror image of the external world displayed upon the surface of an 
individual tabula rasa, but rather the inward turning and inflection of an 
interpretative perspective that created a hierarchy by positing values. 
 Nietzsche explained how this internalized social structure (Gesell-
schaftsbau) was created and how it was internalized, through his de-
————
34  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, Section 8, 274, »Warum ich so weise bin«. The English can be 
found in NORMAN: 2005, 83.
35  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 33. The English translation is taken NORMAN: 2002, 19.
36  For one description of these active and reactive forces see DELEUZE: 1983, 39–72.
For a critique of Deleuze’s argument see STATEN: 1990, 16–18.
37  Mark Warren writes: »There is a neccessary tension between the universalizing 
aspects of language, with its hold over consciousness, and the individualizing qualities 
of experience and biography. Unless we see that this is a problem, Nietzsche is arguing, 
we fail to understand the experiential bases of meaning and agency.« See WARREN: 1988,
57.
38  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 264–265: »Im Übringen sei man davor gewarnt, diese Be-
griffe ›rein‹ und ›unrein‹ nicht von vornherein zu schwer, zu weit oder gar symbolisch 
zu nehmen: alle Begriffe der älteren Menschheit sind vielmehr anfänglich in einem uns 
kaum ausdenkbaren Maasse grob, plump, äusserlich, eng, geradezu und inbesondere 
unsymbolisch verstanden worden.« The English translation comes from KAUFMANN and
HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 31–32. It reads, »One should be warned, moreover, against taking 
these concepts ›pure‹ and ›impure‹ too ponderously or broadly, not to say symbolically: 
all the concepts of ancient man were rather at first incredibly uncouth, coarse, external, 
narrow, straightforward, and altogether unsymbolic in meaning to a degree that we can 
scarcely conceive.« 
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scription of the origin of consciousness and conscience in Zur Genealo-
gie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals). According to this text, 
conscience originates in the »dominirende Instinkt« (dominating in-
stinct) of the »souveraine Mensch« (sovereign human) who becomes 
aware of the »Priviligium der Verantwortlichkeit« (Privilege of Responsi-
bility) and consciousness came as the result of the suffering of those who 
were dominated.39 For Nietzsche, a healthy conscience is distinguished 
by its ability to distinguish between what to remember and what to forget. 
This noble »Priviligeum der Verantwortlichkeit« was the result of an act 
of self-affirmation, an active valorization of the ability to extend the will 
into the future. This ability to select and affirm is the hallmark of noble
perspective. According to Nietzsche, the bodies that saw from this per-
spective conquered, organized, and codified the proto-societies of pre-
history.
 »Schlechtes Gewissen« (Bad Conscience), on the other hand, is cre-
ated when »Die Feindschaft, die Grausamkeit, die Lust an der Verfol-
gung, am Überfall, am Wechsel, an der Zerstörung – Alles das gegen die 
Inhaber solcher Instinkte sich wendend« (Hostility, cruelty, joy in perse-
cuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all this turned against the 
possessors of such instincts).40 The creation of this proto-state with its 
system of hierarchy, law, and domination, abetted the development of a 
»herd animal« who internalized his dammed up aggression and thereby 
created a reactive inner life. Suffering, denied an outlet and turned in-
ward, became meaningless, for it lacked a witness. A God or Gods were 
created to serve as witnesses, and gave meaning as he/they assumed the 
role(s) of creator(s). The priest seized upon this unhealthy condition and 
created a perspective epitomized by ressentiment. Ressentiment is de-
fined as being the inability to digest experience. From this inability to 
forget, the spirit of revenge is born. The internal space of consciousness 
developed out of this reactive condition: »Die ganze innere Welt, ursprüng-
lich dünn wie zwischen zwei Häute eingespannt, ist in dem Maasse [sic] 
aus einander- und aufgegangen, hat Tiefe, Breite, Höhe bekommen, als 
die Entladung des Menschen nach Aussen gehemmt worden ist.« (The
whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two 
layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, 
————
39  NIETZSCHE: 1993, 294.
40  Ibid., 323. The English translation is from KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 85.
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breath, and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge 
of man’s instincts were obstructed.)41 Ressentiment, as Nietzsche re-
marked, is an illness that is pregnant with possibility. As Robert Guay 
points out, »the bad conscience was what created the self-distance 
needed to take oneself as an object.«42 Nietzsche also reminds us: »Das 
tiefe Leiden machte vornehm; es trennt.« (Profound suffering makes you 
noble: it separates.)43 Repression opens up the possibility of both the 
sovereign individual and the human as a herd animal. Nietzsche under-
stood this to be his own context and his own struggle. 
 Though there is more to Nietzsche’s narrative and the description 
above is schematic, my intention is merely to point out that the noble
ability to forget and to use memory selectively to extend the will is one 
internalized perspective, and the herd animal’s inability to digest experi-
ence is another. In other words, the noble creates and values, while the 
enslaved herd animal believes that he is created and values an absolute. 
The agonistic relationship between these two perspectives is part and 
parcel of the multiplicity within the »individual«. 
 As a result of this internalization of the relationship between these 
two perspectives, a struggle ensues within the body as well as without. 
Self-overcoming within a body, which interacts as a social structure (Ge-
sellschaftsbau), suggests the imposition of an internal hierarchy. The 
principle that imposes this hierarchy is what Nietzsche calls the »organi-
sierende Idee«.44 He states that this self-organization is not based on the 
selfless principle of living for others or an abstract goal, nor is it based on 
the self-knowledge of a stable subject. It is the fruit which ripens by 
avoiding »grosse […] Imperative« (all great imperatives), »sie bildet der 
Reihe nach alle dienenden Vermögen aus, bevor sie irgend Etwas von der 
dominirenden [sic] Aufgabe, von ›Ziel‹, ›Zweck‹, ›Sinn‹ verlauten lässt« 
(it develops all the servile faculties before giving any clue of the domi-
neering task, the ›goal‹, the ›purpose‹ or the ›meaning‹).45
————
41  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 322. The English is from DIETHE 2007, 57.
42  GUAYN: 2006, 358.
43  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 225, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Aphorism 270. The 
English translation comes from NORMAN: 2002, 166.
44  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 294, Ecce Homo, Section 9, »Warum ich so klug bin«. 
The English translation comes from NORMAN: 2005, 97.
45  Ibid. For the original and the translation. 
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 »Der Wille, einen Affekt zu überwinden, ist zuletzt doch nur der Wille 
eines anderen oder mehrerer anderer Affekte.« (The will to overcome an 
emotion is ultimately only the will of another emotion or of several oth-
ers.)46 Self-overcoming is the result of an internal play of forces in which 
discrete aspects of the internalized social structure master other subser-
vient aspects. Therefore, self-overcoming is not a reconciliation of equals, 
but a domination of certain drives over others. The self then is a site of 
competing perspectives and interpretations. Self-overcoming is not the 
discovery of a true self, or the positing of the ego as text, – it is the affir-
mation of a dominant perspective. A genealogy of self is the selective use 
of memory in order to affirm this dominance. A genealogy of self is an 
affirmative praxis, an event of self-interpretation in which a noble per-
spective, a healthy perspective, subdues competing interpretations. »Un-
serm stärksten Triebe, dem Tyrannen in uns, unterwirft sich nicht nur 
unsere Vernunft, sondern auch unser Gewissen.« (To our strongest drive, 
the tyrant in us, not only our reason but also our conscience submits.)47
So in der That erscheint mir jetzt jene lange Krankheits-Zeit: ich entdeckte das 
Leben gleichsam neu, mich selber eingerechnet, ich schmeckte alle guten und 
selbst kleinen Dinge, wie sie Andre nicht leicht schmecken könnten, – ich 
machte aus meinem Willen zur Gesundheit, zum Leben, meine Philosophie … 
(This is, in fact, how that long period of illness looks to me now: I discovered 
life anew, as it were, myself included, I tasted good and even small things in 
ways other people cannot easily do, – I created my philosophy from out of my 
will to health, to life.)48
Ecce Homo, Nietzsche’s genealogy of self is not an autobiography, it is a 
philosophy, a praxis. It is the dramatization of a way of life.49 The gene-
alogy of self is a site where the genetic aspects of a created perspective 
are untangled, where the interaction of forces is displayed, where a hier-
————
46  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 93, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Aphorism 117. The Eng-
lish translation comes from HOLLINGDALE: 1990, 98.
47  NIETZSCHE: 1993, 100, Aphorism 158. For the translation HOLLINGDALE: 1990, 103.
48  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, Section 2, 266–267, Ecce Homo »Warum ich so weise 
bin«. The English translation is from NORMAN: 2005, 76.
49  Please note the difference between my claim that this is a dramatization of a way of 
life and Alexander NEHAMAS’ claims in his wonderful Nietzsche. Life as Literature
(1985). Nehamas argues that Nietzsche makes a literary character out of himself; my 
point is that Nietzsche performs and dramatizes those pre-discursive contradictions 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter. 
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archy is established, and where health is affirmed. The genealogy of self
displays a locus of selection and reveals the antinomy of self. 
 »Abgerechnet nämlich, dass ich ein décadent bin, bin ich auch dessen 
Gegensatz.« (Granting that I am a decadent, I am the opposite as well.)50
This celebrated sentence reveals the antinomy discussed above. Nietzsche 
goes on to describe how he used his decadence, his sickness, as an »ener-
gisches Stimulans zum Leben« (energetic stimulus to life).51 The next step 
in our analysis is to show how the genealogy of self is a praxis, a per-
formance of subject construction in a narrative with a weakened truth 
claim. In his ensuing description of the healthy individual, Nietzsche 
stated: »Er sammelt instinktiv aus Allem, was er sieht, hört, erlebt, seine
Summe: er ist ein auswählendes Princip, er lässt Viel durchfallen.« (He 
instinctively gathers his totality from everything he sees, hears, experi-
ences: he is a principle of selection, he lets many things fall by the way-
side.) 52  Like the noble in Zur Genealogie der Moral, the healthy 
individual knows how willfully to forget. This principle of selection im-
plies that the healthy individual is a locus of interpretation, a creator of a 
perspective through a process of »instinctive preference«. However, if the
genealogy of self is a performative praxis, as I have claimed, how is this 
process affirmed? How does one overcome himself? Nietzsche clues us 
in: »Wohlan, ich bin das Gegenstück eines décadent: denn ich beschrieb 
eben mich.« (Well then, I am the opposite of a decadent: because I have 
just described myself.)«53
 For Nietzsche, self-description was not a recapitulation of the quali-
ties of a static ego. It was an affirmation, the performance of an act of 
self-overcoming. In the genealogy of self, writing is the affirmative act of 
self-creation, the expressive act of self-definition through which the 
dominant interpretative perspective is valorized. If autobiography is a 
description of the »doer,« a genealogy of self is the creation of the 
»deed«. It revolves around the selective use of memory in order to affirm 
active forces. This is not a banal falsification of the past, but rather a 
manifestation of the ritual aspects of the Wiederkunft des Gleichen 
————
50  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 266. The English translation is from NORMAN: 2005, 76.
51  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 266. For the original, English translation: NORMAN:
2005, 77.
52  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 267. English Translation: NORMAN: 2005, 77.
53  Ibid. For both the original and the translation.  
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(Eternal Return of the Same). This ritual aspect is a performative re-
enactment of the creation of a dominant perspective through naming. 
This leads us to a question: How does language affirm a noble perspec-
tive?
Das Herrenrecht, Namen zu geben, geht so weit, dass man sich erlauben sollte, 
den Ursprung der Sprache selbst als Machtäusserung der Herrenschenden zu 
fassen: sie sagen »das ist das und das,« sie sieglen jegliches Ding und Gesche-
hen mit einem Laute ab und nehmen es dadurch gleichsam in Besitz. 
(The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself 
to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part 
of the rulers: they say »this is this and this,« they seal everything and event 
with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it.)54
In Chapter four, this citation was utilized to illustrate Nietzsche’s concep-
tion that the act of naming is an interpretative process that appropriates 
by making a thing or an event proximate. Our illustration in that instance 
was an example of how valuation occurred in a moment of engagement 
with Strindberg’s play, Fadren (The Father). The act of naming manifests 
itself in his genealogical work as a means of making the past proximate 
through appropriation. The issue here is a suspension of temporality. Our 
task is to explicate how this process treats elements of the past, regardless 
of whether these elements are historical or experiential. The key to un-
derstanding this process is Nietzsche’s conception of the relationship 
between naming and origination. 
 In the citation above, Nietzsche stated that language was »originally« 
a form of possession, that naming seals and prolongs the domination of 
things and events in the world. However, the concept of origins is prob-
lematic in Nietzsche’s genealogies for he declared: 
die Ursache der Entstehung eines Dings und dessen schliessliche Nützlichkeit, 
dessen thatsächliche Verwendung und Einordnung in ein System von Zwe-
cken toto coelo auseinander liegen; dass etwas Vorhandenes, irgendwie Zu-
Stande-Gekommenes immer wieder von einer ihm überlegenen Macht auf 
neue Ansichten ausgelegt, neu in Beschlag genommen, zu einem neuen Nut-
zen umgebildt und umgerichtet wird; dass alles Geschehen in der organischen 
Welt ein Überwältigen, Herrwerden ein Neu-Interpetieren, ein Zurecht-
machen ist, bei dem der bisherige »Sinn« und »Zweck« nothwendig verdun-
kelt oder ganz ausgelöscht werden muss. 
————
54  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 260. The English translation is from KAUFMANN and
HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 26.
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(the cause and the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employ-
ment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, hav-
ing somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, 
taken over, transformed and redirected by some power superior to it; all events 
in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and 
becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which 
any previous »meaning« and »purpose« are necessarily obscured or even 
obliterated.)55
There is a distance between origin and use, and this difference is ex-
plained by an act of mastery through interpretation. Seeing this, it would 
be a mistake to explain Nietzsche’s understanding of the origin of lan-
guage solely from his statement on the lordly right to name. His under-
standing of the possibility of discerning origins explains the parentheses 
around his postulation about the origination of language. One could 
claim that whenever Nietzsche posits an origin, the parenthetical nature 
of his postulation is understood. For in a Nietzschean genealogy, origins 
are posited to discern a notion of the active creation of something that 
has been transformed through time. This clears the ground for a geneal-
ogy that will compete with other interpretations. 
 Therefore, this parenthetical statement about the origin of language 
should not be taken as a description of a static relationship between a 
noble perspective and the ability to name. In Zur Genealogie der Moral 
(On the Genealogy of Morals), Nietzsche traced just how far linguistic 
purpose has come from its origin, and he exposes this movement as a 
redefinition of the terms of valuation in the service of the ascetic ideal. 
His positing of origins can be understood as the deconstruction of an 
alloy where noble components are parenthetically separated from the 
base metals. The component metals of the alloy remain, but a new hierar-
chy is established and the alloy is given a new name. As Sarah Kofman 
writes: »Genealogical etymology does not aim to find the originary, true, 
and accurate meaning, but to discover multiple origins and to hierarchize 
them.«56 This act of ranking has a purpose as well, for »vergessen wir 
auch diess nicht: es genügt, neue Namen und Schätzungen und Wahr-
scheinlichkeiten zu schaffen, um auf die Länge hin neue ›Dinge‹ zu 
schaffen« (let us not also forget that in the long run it is enough to create 
————
55  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 313–314, for the original, KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE:
1967, 77, for the translation. 
56  KOFMAN: 1993, 87.
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new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create 
new »things«).57
 Nietzschean genealogy, as a performative act, reclaims the right to 
name for its interpretive perspective. The »origin« of language is paren-
thetically posited in order to show that, for the noble, language is the 
active mastering of something in the present. In other words, naming is 
the taking possession, the domination of a thing by the use of language. 
Nietzsche constructs an etymology for the words »gut,« »schlecht,« and 
»Böse«58 to illustrate the self-activating nature of noble valuation and to 
contrast this with the herd method of naming through reaction. Geneal-
ogy performs a double task: it posits »origins« in order to untangle the 
»verknüpft, verhäkelt« antithetical elements that have been homogenized 
by moral valuation.59 Then it uses narrative to rank these elements by 
virtue of their activity and reactivity, thereby renaming and re-possessing 
the concept. 
 This process is identical in both Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the 
Genealogy of Morals) and Ecce Homo. The condition of decadence that 
Nietzsche saw as pervading the environment of Western civilization, the 
development of man into »ein krankhaftes Thier« (a sickly animal),60 is 
part of an internal landscape in the genealogy of self. Ecce Homo,
Nietzsche’s genealogy of self, is the location where this decadence is 
utilized as a stimulus for life. The energy derived from this stimulus pro-
duces a self-description that is used as a means of self-overcoming. As 
Nietzschean self-description is not merely a recapitulation of the qualities 
of a static ego, the description of the development of the dominance of 
moral valuation is not the history of a static process. The Nietzschean 
genealogy of morals is not the description of the »doer,« the »good man,« 
it is the enactment of the »deed« of a self-description that re-evaluates. 
Genealogy does not trace the origins of this »good man«; it valorizes the 
creative self-interpretative act that calls itself good. It follows that any 
positing of an origin sets the original »deed« in parentheses. 
————
57  NIETZSCHE: 1988c, KSA 3, 422, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Aphorism 58. NAUCK-
HOFF and DEL CARO: 2001, 70, for the translation. 
58  »Good,« »Bad,« and »Evil«. 
59  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 17, Jenseits von Gut und Böse.
60  NIETZSCHE employs this term in Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1993, KSA 5, 411.
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 It is important to recall that Nietzsche conceived of the will to power
as an interpretative complex and as such it is »nicht ein Sein, nicht ein 
Werden, sondern ein Pathos ist die elementarste Thatsache, aus der sich 
erst ein Werden, ein Wirken ergiebt« (not a being, not a becoming, but a 
pathos, is the most elementary fact, and becoming, effecting is only a 
result of this).61 The will to power is the expansiveness of a perspective as 
it engages other perspectives. Nietzsche’s positing of dual origins (of 
health and decadence in himself, of the noble and the slave modes of 
valuation) is a metaphorical representation of the agon of interpretation. 
This agon is a product of the collision of history (interpretation wearing 
the mask of necessity) or as Nietzsche would put it, fate, and the contin-
gency of experience (the state of becoming without a telos). The site of 
this collision resides within an interpretative hermeneutic circle that 
takes the form of a genealogy. An interpretation that makes use of a ge-
nealogy analyses these agonistic »origins,« which by definition are seen 
from a distance. This explains why Nietzsche as a genealogist, utilizes a 
Pathos der Distanz (Pathos of Distance). However, the second moment 
of valuation from this perspective is repossession through naming. It is 
through the employment of polemic, a pathos of engagement that the 
parenthesis of an »originary« moment of active creation is reproduced. A 
genealogy in a polemical voice is linguistic reclamation. It creates its 
»truth« through language.62
Wahrheit ist somit nicht etwas, was da wäre und was aufzufinden, zu entde-
cken wäre, – sondern etwas, das zu schaffen ist und das den Namen für einen 
Prozeß abgiebt, mehr noch für einen Willen der Überwältigung, der an sich 
kein Ende hat: Wahrheit hineinlegen, als ein processus in infinitum, ein akti-
ves Bestimmen, nicht ein Bewußtwerden von etwas, das »an sich« fest und 
bestimmt wäre. Es ist ein Wort für den »Willen zur Macht«. 
(Truth is thus not something that’s there and must be found out, discovered, 
but something that must be made and that provides the name for a process, or 
rather for a will to overcome, a will that left to itself has no end: inserting truth, 
as a processus in infinitum, an active determining, not a becoming conscious 
————
61  NIETZSCHE: 1972, 51, Entry 14 [79]. The English translation: STURGE: 2003, 247.
62  Most commentators marginalize the importance of polemics in the Nietzschean 
genealogy. For example Daniel W.Conway  remarks »Nietzsche advertises the Geneal-
ogy as a polemic [eine Streitschrift]; it contains both a genealogical interpretation and 
elements of a symptomatological critique. Many of the book’s confusions are attribut-
able to Nietzsche’s failure (or unwillingness) to distinguish clearly between his geneal-
ogy of Morals and the critical method it enables.« (CONWAY: 1994, 329).
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of something, that is »in itself« fixed and determinate. It is a word for the »will 
to power«.)63
For Nietzsche, »truth« was the name given to a perpetual process of 
overcoming. It was a linguistic representation of great fluidity. If we asso-
ciate genealogy as a description of the past with the notion of history or 
autobiography, this presents us with a paradox. It is as if Nietzsche were 
saying, if an origin is posited, it is a creation of a »truth,« a willful over-
coming. Since the will cannot will backwards in time, the »truth« claim 
of a Nietzschean genealogy can only reside in the present or the future. 
Historia abscondita. – Jeder grosse Mensch hat eine rückwirkende Kraft: alle 
Geschichte wird um seinetwillen wieder auf die Waage gestellt, und tausend 
Geheimnisse der Vergangenheit kriechen aus ihren Schlupfwinkeln – hinein in 
seine Sonne. Es ist gar nicht abzusehen, was Alles einmal noch Geschichte 
sein wird. Die Vergangenheit is vielleicht immer noch wesentlich unentdeckt! 
Es bedarf noch so vieler rückwirkender Kräfte! 
(Historia abscondita. – Every great human being exerts a retroactive force: for 
his sake all of history is put on the scale again, and a thousand secrets of the 
past crawl out of their hiding places – into his sunshine. There is no telling 
what may yet become a part of history. Maybe the past is still essentially undis-
covered! So many retroactive forces are still needed!)64
That is to say, »truth« manifests in the present as a re-valuation and in 
the future as a dominant perspective.65 Nietzsche’s genealogical method 
is in this sense an explication of the Aphorism 22 in Jenseits von Gut und 
Böse (Beyond Good and Evil). He bares the device of his interpretative 
process and if the objection is raised that his genealogy is only an inter-
pretation – »nun, – um so besser« (well, so much the better). 
 This phrase brings us to the subject of the role that polemic plays in 
the Nietzschean genealogy. It is my contention that there is a double 
movement in the Nietzschean genealogy. Genealogical description en-
closes »origins« parenthetically; polemic opens up the parentheses and 
thereby initiates the performative aspect of the genealogical process of 
affirmation. As »truth« is a perpetual process, this affirmation is subject 
to constant repetition. This double movement manifests Nietzsche’s 
————
63  NIETZSCHE: 1970, 49, Entry 9 [91]. The English translation:STURGE: 2003, 155.
64  NIETZSCHE: 1988c, KSA 3, 404, Aphorism 34. The English translation is from 
NAUCKHOFF and DEL CARO: 2001, 53–54.
65  As described in the first chapter of this book, Brandes’ notion of a vital realism and 
Strindberg’s description of his »greater naturalism« bear family resemblances to 
Nietzsche’s views on truth and naming.
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Wiederkunftsgedanke (thought of the eternal return). It is a form of dif-
ferentiated repetition as a species of the Pathos of Distance. First gene-
alogy creates a hierarchy between contradictory historical forces and their 
internalization. Then the act of describing this process of ranking in a 
polemical voice engages with these forces and makes them proximate 
through the process of re-naming. This process creates affect both within 
and without. The very same contradictory forces appear in both Zur Ge-
nealogie der Moral and Ecce Homo. In either case, the »doer« is a fic-
tion and the »deed,« (the struggle between contradictory forces in the 
absence of a witness to the subsequent suffering engendered by this con-
flict) is recreated through the employment of a polemical voice. 
Nietzsche’s genealogical method affirms the past by making it an affect of 
a momentary act of the will. Polemic is the means by which the historical 
or autobiographical past is addressed contemporaneously. The paradoxi-
cal claim that the truth of the past resides in the present colors the 
Nietzschean genealogy and points to its performative imperative. 
Polemic
Im Grunde lag mir gerade damals etwas viel Wichtigeres am Herzen als eignes 
oder fremdes Hypothesenwesen über den Ursprung der Moral (oder, genauer: 
letzteres allein um eines Zweckes willen, zu dem es eins unter vielen Mitteln 
ist). Es handelte sich für mich um den Werth der Moral, – und darüber hatte 
ich mich fast allein mit meinem grossen Lehrer Schopenhauer auseinanderzu-
setzen, an den wie an einem Gegenwärtigen jenes Buch, die Leidenschaft und 
der geheime Widerspruch jenes Buchs sich wendet (– denn auch jenes Buch 
war eine »Streitschrift«). 
(Even then my real concern was something much more important than hy-
pothesis-mongering, whether my own or other people’s, on the origin of moral-
ity (or more precisely: the latter concerned me solely for the sake of a goal to 
which it was only one means among many). What was at stake was the value
of morality – and over this I had to come to terms almost exclusively with my 
great teacher Schopenhauer, to whom that book of mine, the passion and the 
concealed contradiction of that book, addressed itself as if to a contemporary ( 
– for that book, too, was a »polemic«).)66
In this citation from the »Vorrede« of Zur Genealogie der Moral (On
the Genealogy of Morals), Nietzsche is quite clear about both the man-
ner in which the question of morality will be addressed and the impor-
————
66  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 251–252, Zur Genealogy der Moral, »Vorrede«. The Eng-
lish translation is found in KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 19.
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tance of an understanding of his own past. In the previous section of the 
»Vorrede,« Nietzsche referred to several of his earlier statements about 
the question of morality. He states that one should compare what he had 
previously said about the subject in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 
(Human, All Too Human), and Morgenröte (Daybreak). In the citation 
above, the latter text was said to be addressed to his teacher, Schopen-
hauer,67 as if he were a contemporary (Gegenwärtiger), for that book too 
was a polemic (Streitschrift). In other words, polemic is an interpretive 
pathos of engagement, it makes the past proximate. If Nietzsche’s goal is 
not »Hypothesenwesen« and the goal of depicting the origin of moral 
thinking was only one means among many, then the aim of the genealogy 
is not the depiction of a stable historical »truth«. Polemic addresses the 
past as present and polemical genealogy as a »truth« creating activity 
struggles against other interpretations that claim to depict history based 
on a reconstruction of the past by making the past proximate and subject 
to reinterpretation. 
 A Streitschrift is an argument or a struggle in writing. This leads us to 
a question. What does Nietzsche’s Streitschrift struggle against? In his 
later work, Nietzsche struggles against the highest values, the ascetic
ideal. »Es gilt, das ungeheure, ferne und so versteckte Land der Moral – 
der wirklich dagewesenen, wirklich gelebten Moral – mit lauter neuen 
Frage und gleichsam neuen Augen zu bereisen.« (The project is to trav-
erse with quite novel questions, and as though with new eyes, the enor-
mous, distant and so well hidden land of morality – of morality that has 
actually existed, actually been lived.)68 The rediscovery of this distant 
land implies a journey to the past by means of genealogical investigation. 
Nietzsche’s project seeks out the ossified elements that lie behind moral 
valuation, »der uns heute nur deshalb aus den Augen gerückt ist, weil er 
– siegreich gewesen ist« (which we no longer see because it – has been 
————
67  The choice of engaging Schopenhauer is interesting on several fronts: first, by 
engaging with his »teacher,« Nietzsche enables the creation of a distinct perspective, 
and second, as Andreas Ur SOMMER points out, Nietzsche mentions »nihilists« for the 
first time in the summer of 1880 and calls Schopenhauer »their philosopher«. Sommer’s 
reference is found in Nihilism and Skepticism in Nietzsche, an article in ANSELL-
PEARSON: 2006. The reference to Schopenhauer can be found on pg. 252. Nietzsche’s 
original formulation can be found in KSA 9, 4 [103].
68  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 254 The English translation can be found in KAUFMANN
and HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 21.
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victorious.)69 According to Nietzsche, these elements have crystallized 
through time into dogma and wear the mask of the eternal and the un-
changing. This leads us to our next, perhaps more properly Nietzschean 
question: how does Nietzsche’s Streitschrift struggle against the ascetic 
ideal? His answer: »Damit ein Heiligthum aufgerichtet werden kann, 
muss ein Heiligthum zerbrochen warden.« (If a temple is to be erected a
temple must be destroyed.)70
 If the stated goal of the genealogy of morals is to determine the Wer-
the (value) of morality by tracing their »origins,« and if this process un-
tangles the hidden origins of the ascetic mode of valuation in order to 
expose it as a reactive inversion of a noble and active perspective while 
making the contradictory claim that origins are no indication of moral 
valuation in the present, then the posited original activity of valuation 
must be put in parentheses. Genealogy turns its face towards the past. 
Polemic is the means by which genealogy engages the past in the present. 
Polemic opens the parentheses, which enclose origins. This enables the 
warlike and creative powers of interpretation to engage with the domi-
nant, siegereich ascetic/moral interpretations of rival genealogies. The 
use of a polemical voice makes »history« a creative force that engages 
contemporary modes of valuation. 
 Polemic is a means of overcoming. It transforms description into de-
scription and then it re-inscribes. It unwrites by writing, and then it can 
re-write. It destroys in order to create. If genealogy as a discrete element 
can be regarded as a re-creation of das Pathos der Distanz (the Pathos of 
Distance), a genealogy that relies on polemic to engage the past in the 
present moment can be seen as creating a simultaneous pathos of en-
gagement. Nietzschean perspectival interpretation oscillates between a 
pathos of distance and a pathos of engagement. In Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy, this oscillation has its parallel in the way the eternal return is able to 
affirm the past in the moment despite the inability of the will to will 
backwards. In Nietzschean genealogy, history returns in a polemical 
present. The parentheses that enclose the past are exploded by the power 
of a discourse that claims the noble right to possess by naming for itself. 
————
69  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 268. The English translation comes from KAUFMANN and
HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 34.
70  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 335. The English is found in KAUFMANN and HOLLING-
DALE: 1967, 95.
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Nietzschean genealogy performed as a polemic is not history nor is it 
autobiography; it is dynamite. 
 The Nietzschean genealogy as dynamite, however, does not merely 
destroy; it creates. A consideration of his genealogical method in isola-
tion tells us what Nietzsche intended to destroy. But the what tells us 
nothing about how Nietzsche claims that he can create by destroying. An 
understanding of how will enable us to understand why Nietzsche posits 
that creation necessitates destruction. 
 The truth claim of the Nietzschean genealogy is that »truth« is a per-
petual creative process, which by virtue of its perspectival quality creates 
the position of the subject within colliding and antagonistic forces. Inter-
pretations born of different perspectives struggle against one another both 
within and without the body; positing values as any linguistic creation is 
governed by a selection process, a naming, that appropriates. A genea-
logical text written in the polemical voice performs this struggle. It is an 
interpretation and as such engages other perspectives. 
 The key to this performance is narrative. However, before illustrating 
how the Nietzschean genealogy performs a narration in which form su-
percedes content, I will address a possible objection to my interpretation. 
Nietzsche’s claim that destruction implies creation is not merely a meta-
physical claim based on the myth of Dionysus. Rather, the myth of Dio-
nysus serves as a metaphor for his philosophical praxis. Dionysian 
dismemberment, the destruction of a body, always anticipates a return in 
a new form. Der Wille zur Macht (the will to power), as an interpretative 
pathos, obliterates (creates oblivion) by willfully forgetting in order to 
make a new interpretation manifest. As Nietzschean genealogy oscillates 
between a pathos of distance and a pathos of engagement, it recreates the 
past in order to affirm it through an act of the will in the moment. This 
movement between the two types of pathos performs an act of creation 
that enables an affirmation of the eternal return through a selection proc-
ess that willfully relegates and omits aspects of the past. Der Wille zur 
Macht is the name for an interpretative complex. There is no claim for 
the primacy of a stable text or for a truth that resides outside of interpre-
tation. In a creative act, it imposes form on raw material. This process of 
creation uses experience and re-forms it in the present. Creation thus 
implies an active engagement between a creator and his understanding of 
the past. The past is manifested in the present as an activity through 
which willful and selective memory affirms only certain aspects of the 
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past in order to give form to experience in a momentary act. This selective 
process is not relative, but relational; it ranks. As perspectival interpreta-
tion is derived from the position of a body, and the body is likened to a 
social structure, interpretation is dependent upon a hierarchy. The inter-
pretation that abets an act of creation is a willful valuation of the past in 
the moment. As the body as social structure forgets through interpreta-
tion, the creative process is in-corporated within the body as a condition 
of creation. Interpretation requires an affirmative forgetting, it destroys in 
order to create. This is a description of a process, not a metaphysical 
claim.
Genealogy and Polemic 
Man ist um den Preis Künstler, daß man das, was alle Nichtkünstler »Form« 
nennen, als Inhalt, als »die Sache selbst« empfindet. Damit gehört man frei-
lich in eine verkehrte Welt: denn nunmehr wird einem der Inhalt zu etwas 
bloß Formalem – unser Leben eingerechnet. 
(The price of being an artist is that one feels what all non-artists call ›form‹ to 
be content, to be ›the matter itself‹. Certainly, this places one in a world
turned upside down: for now content becomes something merely formal – in-
cluding our life.)71
Nietzsche’s genealogies give form to suffering. Der Wille zur Macht is a 
pathos, that is to say, an occurrence of suffering or a rhetorical mode that 
addresses individuals and their emotions. Der Wille zur Macht as an 
interpretive force experiences the occasion of suffering as individual ad-
dress, as a process of individuation. As discussed earlier, Nietzsche posits 
that the creation of consciousness came as the result of the wars of pre-
history that created the first proto-societies. In Nietzsche’s genealogies, 
profound suffering separates within the individual as well as without. The 
individual is a site of competing emotions that are ranked according to 
the organizing idea. As Nietzsche stated that the individual body is like a 
society and claims that societies are created by the victorious who extend 
their dominion by establishing a hierarchy, this organizing idea repre-
sents a species of self-conquest or Selbstüberwindung. Selbstuber-
windung is affirmed by self-description, a selection process that needs to 
impose a form upon memory in the present. For Nietzsche, a polemic, a 
war of words, is a willful, creative »deed« that must obliterate in order to 
————
71  NIETZSCHE: 1970, 251, Entry 11[3]. The English translation is from STURGE: 2003, 207.
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impose form. As he believed that creation is interpretation, the individual 
interprets and seeks to extend his will through struggle with other inter-
pretations for »ein Philosoph, der kriegerisch ist, fordert auch Probleme 
zum Zweikampf heraus« (a warlike philosopher will challenge problems 
to single combat).72 Internal warfare is the means by which Nietzsche 
creates what he said that he had lacked in his previous aphoristic efforts 
to criticize moral thinking, »eine eigne Sprache für diese eignen Dinge« 
(my own language for my own things).73
 The answer to the question of how the Nietzschean polemic struggles 
against the ascetic ideal is that it creates by destroying. This led us to the 
question of how Nietzsche performs this creative destruction. The answer 
to this question has been far too abstract up to this point. The postulation 
that Nietzschean genealogy is predicated upon an act of creation that 
obliterates elements of the past in order to valuate and appropriate in the 
present suffices as a starting point for further analysis. However, the 
Nietzschean genealogy must be shown to perform in a different way than 
a genealogy that is beholden to the ideal of an absolute truth and an ab-
solute origin. The specific case needs to fit the abstract model. The claim 
that answering how Nietzsche creates by destroying tells us the why of 
polemical genealogy suggests that form predominates over content. It also 
gives us insight into why Nietzsche valorizes artistic creation and for-
wards an aesthetic answer to an ethical question. 
 The preceding discussion attempted to point out similarities between 
the process of artistic creation and the Nietzschean concept of self-
overcoming that he believed was an intrinsic element of creating an in-
terpretative perspective. These similarities suggest that Nietzschean gene-
alogy has a similar performative imperative. It is important to remember 
that Nietzsche did not believe that form was identical to content. He 
rejects the concept of identity in principle. Rather, the relationship be-
tween the two is an interpretative complex in which content is per-
formed and form is content laden. 
 The form of Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Mor-
als) is a genealogy written in a polemical voice. The content tells the story 
————
72  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, (Ecce Homo, »Warum ich so weise bin«). The English 
translation is found in NORMAN: 2005, 82.
73  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 251, Zur Genealogie der Moral, »Vorrede«. The English 
translation is found in KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 18.
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN STRINDBERG AND NIETZSCHE206
of the victory of reactive forces and the ascension of the ascetic ideal to 
the position of being the highest value. However, this narrative, being a 
genealogy, posits an origin for the valuation that structured society before 
this triumph of reactive forces. According to Nietzsche, society was cre-
ated by a war of conquest waged by »ein Rudel blonder Raubthiere« (a 
pack of blond beasts of prey).74 These conquerors organized the proto-
state as a work of »instinktives Formen-schaffen, Formen-aufdrücken« 
(instinctive creation and imposition of forms).75 They instituted a hierar-
chy through a reign of terror and domination, taking away the freedom of 
the masses by enclosing them within the walls of this newly created state. 
These subservient masses were then formed into a herd and their instinc-
tive aggression was turned inward. This original act of creation had its 
price and the conquerors unwittingly created the conditions for their own 
downfall. »Sie sind es nicht, bei denen das ›schlechte Gewissen‹ gewach-
sen ist, das versteht sich von vornherein, – aber es würde nicht ohne sie 
gewachsen sein.« (It is not in them that the ›bad conscience‹ developed, 
that goes without saying – but it would not have developed without
them.)76 The internalization of the tyranny of these blond beasts, this 
schlechtes Gewissen (bad conscience), became the raw material with 
which the priests created the ascetic ideal and led the slave revolt that 
inverted the »originary« system of valuation. This complicity of the Her-
ren in their own downfall is not posited as being the result of a teleology. 
It is the outcome of a struggle and Nietzsche, by no means, believed it to 
be an end result, for »welche Vorzeit übrigens zu allen Zeiten da ist oder 
wieder möglich ist« (this prehistory is in any case present in all ages or 
may also reappear).77 The original act of creation is again put in parenthe-
ses and is said to lie dormant, available for reactivation. 
 The stated goal of Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals is to reveal the 
immoral origins of conventional moral valuation. He does this by positing 
the origins of valuation itself as an attribute of a group of warlike creators 
who took away with »ihrer Hammerschläge, ihrer Künstler-Gewaltsam-
————
74  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 324.
75  Ibid., 325. Notice the double usage of Form. The English translation is found in 
KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 86.
76  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 325. English translation KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE:
1967, 86.
77  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 307. The parentheses are Nietzsche’s. The English transla-
tion is in KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967, 71.
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keit ein ungeheures Quantum Freiheit aus der Welt, mindestens aus der 
Sichtbarkeit geschafft und gleichsam latent gemacht worden wäre« (their 
hammer blows, their artist’s violence made a terrible quanta of freedom 
[disappear] from the world, or at least [they] drove it out of sight and 
made it latent).78 There are two points of note here. First, the freedom 
that was taken out of the world did not disappear; it was latent. Second, 
the hammer blows of the conquerors were destructive in the way that a 
sculptor’s hammer destroys an unformed block in order to create. 
 The form of the Nietzschean genealogy, the process that it performs is 
an attempt to activate this latent freedom, to invert the repression that he 
characterizes as the prominent feature of the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche was 
by no means nostalgic for the blond beast. The truth claim of the genea-
logical narrative is weak and the depiction of the originary act of forma-
tion is metaphorical, a stand-in for a performative act of valuation. As 
Nietzsche understood valuation as a struggle between competing perspec-
tives, the metaphor he employs is war. 
 In the narrative of the origination of moral valuation, the destruction 
of the prehistorical wars of conquest imposed form upon the conquered 
and created a society. This original act of creation was unconscious, 
without meaning. Meaning was created by the priest whose creative act 
was saying no to life and providing his herd with a witness for their suf-
fering. It follows that Nietzsche claimed that the only meaning that hu-
mankind has known is reactive, nihilistic. In the third and last essay of 
Zur Genealogie der Moral entitled »Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?« 
(What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?), Nietzsche polemicizes against 
the dominance of the ascetic ideal in all forms of endeavor. He con-
demned ascetic thinking as a form of thought that was created by the 
phenomenon that he described as follows: »lieber will noch der Mensch 
das Nichts wollen, als nicht wollen« (man would rather will nothingness
than not will).79 For Nietzsche, even the atheists and scientists are guilty 
for despite their denial of God, they leave open the place where he once 
resided. In other words, their belief in absolute truth is a belief in noth-
ingness. This is the peculiarity of Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism. 
————
78  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 325. The English translation is mine. 
79  Ibid., 412. The English translation found in KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967,
163.
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 The content of Zur Genealogie der Moral consists of the positing of 
an originary mode of active creation through war, the revolt against the 
societal structure that was created through these struggles, and a critique 
of the lingering and decaying effect of the ascetic values that emerged 
triumphant. The relationship of this content to the form of a polemical 
genealogy with a weak truth claim reveals the why of the philosophical 
project of the mature Nietzsche. 
 Nietzsche’s genealogical method does not claim priority for the origi-
nal, nor does it posit a telos. Competing perspectives are immanent in the 
interpreter and in constant struggle. Therefore the tone of the genealogy 
is not nostalgic for a way of life that has disappeared. Though polemic is 
a war with words that reclaims the noble right to name, it is not a mi-
metic return of the repressed elements of affirmative creation. As argued 
earlier, the genealogy posits an »origin« which is placed in parentheses. 
Genealogy by virtue of having its gaze directed towards the past performs 
its task under the aegis of a pathos of distance. Polemic, on the other 
hand, is a participant in a struggle and assumes a pathos of engagement. 
The Nietzschean genealogical polemic imposes a form upon the raw 
material of its inquiry by oscillating between these two types of pathos. It 
selects and ranks elements of the past and opens up the parentheses 
around »origins« to reclaim linguistic hegemony. Genealogy selects his-
torical elements and exposes the »origin« of moral valuation to be an 
alloy of immoral elements. Polemic effaces the distance between an »ori-
gin« and the moment of writing by engaging with what Nietzsche calls
reactive elements and releases the energy of the original warlike act of 
creative destruction. As Nietzsche understood naming to be a form of 
domination, polemic as a war of words attempts to create the »truth« of 
the past in the present tense through a struggle with other interpretations. 
The oscillating form of the polemical genealogy brackets the original 
»doer« and reaffirms the »deed,« thereby eliminating the place that he 
claims that previous genealogies of morals which privilege the »good« 
subject. In this way, Nietzsche’s genealogies are aesthetic and not ethical, 
being about the act of creation and not right behavior. Polemic also 
obliterates the place held by an absolute creating agent and denies a tele-
ology for it actively creates its own »truth« through the pathos of en-
gagement and does not view the »historical« as a process that creates 
according to a divine or rational plan. We will return to the implications 
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of Nietzsche’s understanding of the primacy of aesthetic concerns later in 
the chapter. 
 The Nietzschean truth claim was not based on arguing for a historical 
primacy or inevitability, its »truth« is created through performance. For 
Nietzsche, form is the matter itself. However, it is not identical to con-
tent. An internal hierarchy or form dictates the process that creates 
»truth« through the Selbstüberwindung that emerges from linguistic 
reclamation. Expressed through the use of a polemic, genealogy is the 
present tense selection process that imposes form upon a world »nicht,
weil Gesetze in ihr herrschen, sondern weil absolut die Gesetze fehlen,
und jede Macht in jedem Augenblicke ihre letzte Consequenz zieht« (not
because laws prevail in it but because laws are absolutely lacking and
every power draws its ultimate consequences every moment).80 The form 
of Nietzschean genealogies is, in a sense, an explication of Aphorism 22 of 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil). They perform the 
dramatization of a philosophical praxis based on the interaction of com-
peting perspectives both within and without the body, thereby creating a 
self-understanding that is merely formal through an interpretation that is 
trans-formal. 
Allmählich hat sich mir herausgestellt, was jede grosse Philosophie bisher war: 
nämlich das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers und seine Art ungewollter und 
unvermerkter mémoires; insgleichen, dass die moralischen (oder unmorali-
schen) Absichten in jeder Philosophie den eigentlichen Lebenskeim ausmach-
ten, aus dem jedesmal die ganze Pflanze gewachsen ist. 
(It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto 
been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and un-
conscious memoir, moreover, that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every 
philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the 
entire plant has grown).81
Nietzsche’s claim that philosophy is a species of memoir informs us how 
his genealogy of morals interacts with his genealogy of self. It is impor-
tant to remember that his genealogy of morals is the story of the internali-
zation of active creative forces and the creation of the unhealthy
condition of ressentiment. It is also essential to recall that Nietzsche 
————
80  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 37 (Jenseits von Gut und Böse). The English translation 
found in HOLLINGDALE: 1990, 53.
81  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KS 5, 19–20. The English translation is from HOLLINGDALE: 1990,
37.
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN STRINDBERG AND NIETZSCHE210
regards any postulation to be an interpretation, a location of struggle. 
With these two points in mind, let us return to Aphorism 6 cited above to 
understand better the genealogy of self. It concludes:
Umgekehrt ist an dem Philosophie ganz und gar nichts Unpersönliches; und 
inbesondere giebt seine Moral ein entschiedenes und entscheidendes Zeugniss 
dafür ab, wer er ist – das heisst, in welcher Rangordnung die innersten Triebe 
seiner Natur zu einander gestellt sind. 
(In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is nothing whatever impersonal; 
and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive testimony to who he is –
that is to say, to the order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in 
relative to each other.)82
The title page of Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Mo-
rals) had the following inscription: »Dem letztveröffentlichten Jenseits
von Gut und Böse zur Ergänzung und Verdeutlichung beigeben.« (To 
expand upon and clarify the last publication, Beyond Good and Evil.) It 
follows that this genealogy with its ordering of what Nietzsche saw as the 
two opposing interpretative perspectives in his historical environment 
was also considered by him to be the result of an internal struggle, a 
»Rangordnung die innersten Triebe« (a ranking of the innermost drives) 
and as such, a disguised memoir. This explains why Nietzsche was to 
open his genealogy of self, Ecce Homo, with the following words: 
In Voraussicht, dass ich über Kurzem mit der schwersten Forderung an die 
Menschheit herantreten muss, die je an sie gestellt werde, scheint es mir uner-
lässlich zu sagen, wer ich bin.
(In the expectation that soon I will have to confront humanity with the most 
difficult demand it has ever faced, it seemed imperative for me to say who I 
am.) 83
Since »truth« is created and creation is an interpretative event, and to say 
who one is entails a performance of a »deed« in the present rather than 
the excavation of the attributes of a stable past, the genealogy of self is a 
hermeneutic process. This hermeneutic process bares the device of the 
construction of its own horizons through a struggle that is intimately 
related to what Nietzsche saw to be his own historical moment. The ge-
nealogy of self is a conflation of »historical« and experiential conditions 
————
82  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KS 5, 20. The English translation is found in HOLLINGDALE: 1990,
38.
83  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 257 (Ecce Homo, »Vorrede«). The English translation is 
found in NORMAN: 2005, 71.
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in a dynamic relationship, the baring of the device of a self-overcoming 
dependent on an internalization of contradictory perspectives. 
 Seen in this light, genealogy and polemic – the formal elements of the 
oscillation between pathos of proximity and distance – seek to dominate 
other perspectives in an interpretative moment. Nietzsche’s genealogies 
of morals and of self are both sites of simultaneously internal and external 
collision. For Nietzsche, neither the world nor the self were texts, both 
are sites of competing interpretations that need to be mastered and 
ranked in order to impose form on a world of becoming rather than be-
ing. To impose this form, he confronts moral valuation with immorality, 
genealogy with counter-genealogy, and the dogmatic assertions of abso-
lute truth with an affirmation of a lawless and agonistic world. For 
Nietzsche, both the slave and the noble perspectives existed internally as 
well as externally. Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals is not history nor is his 
genealogy of self an autobiography: both works oscillate between these 
two poles. 
 Strindberg recognized that there was a process that was described in 
Nietzsche’s work, and in 1889 he saw this process as an explanation of his 
own authorial project. It is to his work that we now turn. I will return to 
the themes addressed in the discussion above and elaborate upon them, 
analyzing a selection of Strindberg’s texts in light of his claims that he 
had anticipated Nietzsche and that his first »autobiography,« Tjänste-
kvinnans son (Son of a Servant), was a war of liberation. 
 Several claims need greater elaboration. The most prominent of these 
assertions is that there is a commonality in Nietzsche and Strindberg’s 
authorships. In order to show that this commonality is not a matter of 
influence, Strindberg’s claim that the Nietzschean aspects of his author-
ship predate his encounter with the philosopher will be explored. This 
exploration will yield concrete examples that answer to the inappropri-
ateness of an influence model of analyzing the encounter. Second, an 
elaboration of the surface phenomenon of the use of Strindberg and 
Nietzsche as tropes in the anti-realist discourse will clarify the compati-
bility of Strindberg’s conception of his »naturalism« with Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. Third, this compatibility will be elaborated upon further to 
reveal a commonality on the level of form. This form is the genealogy of 
self.
 The genealogy of self will be further explicated in terms of its compo-
nents: the relationship between naming and forgetting, the internalization 
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of a weakened truth claim, the self-referential hermeneutic, and the con-
flation of autobiography and history on the level of subject formation 
within the text. This process of subject formation will reveal that both 
Strindberg and Nietzsche are faced with the dilemma of identification 
without a stable origin. Their solutions to this problem will conclude our 
exploration, as Ecce Homo will be compared to Strindberg’s Inferno.
 My definition of the genealogy of self is dependent on the following 
formal components: the positing of dual origins in the external world, the 
treatment of this world as a text to be interpreted, the subsequent ranking 
of these elements, the highlighting of the presence of these origins in the 
interpreter who then declares his ranking to be a self-overcoming, the 
positing of a self-created »truth« in opposition to a self that is created by 
an absolute agent, and the substitution of this constructed »self« in the 
position once occupied by the notion of an absolute, creating agent of 
»truth«. The remainder of this chapter will trace the development of this 
process in selected texts taken from Strindberg’s production between 1882
and 1898.
 The fourth chapter ended with a discussion of Strindberg’s first and 
only public statement on his encounter with Nietzsche, Mitt förhållande 
til Nietzsche (1894). In this essay, Strindberg presented a model for his 
own understanding of his production, where his first »autobiographical« 
work, Tjänstekvinnans son, acted as a turning point in his authorship. 
He called this turning point a »befrielsekriget« (war of liberation). He 
then mentioned a number of his own texts as proof of his anticipation of 
the philosopher. These texts were divided into works that were anticipa-
tory of his encounter with Nietzsche and those which were supported by 
Nietzschean texts after the encounter: the first group included three short 
stories published in 1887 and the second group was comprised of the 
preface to Fröken Julie (Miss Julie) and the novella Tschandala, both 
written in 1889. These short stories were all later connected in what 
Strindberg called his Vivesecktioner and were all concerned with the 
psychological effects and power struggles waged both internally and out 
in the world. The preface to Fröken Julie is famous for the notion of the 
characterless character.84 Tschandala is a rather flawed novella whose 
————
84  STRINDBERG: 1984a, 104–105, Fröken Julie, »Förord«. Strindberg’s argument for the 
employment of »characterless« characters unfolds as follows: the term character had 
been employed originally as a designation for the dominating aspect of a »själskomplex« 
(soul complex), then the middle class appropriated the term in order to fix roles and 
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protagonist is a Swedish noble in a conflict with a treacherous Gypsy. 
This novella is a vulgar masking of Strindberg’s own conflict with a Dan-
ish Gypsy, and his experience is painted through the perspective of 
Nietzsche’s discussion of the Book of Manu in Jenseits von Gut und 
Böse.
Mitt Förhållande till Nietzsche concluded with a challenge from 
Strindberg to his readers to review his production prior to the encounter 
with the philosopher and to see if he had not anticipated the aspect of his 
work that had been designated as »Nietzschean«. It is my contention that 
there are Nietzschean elements in Strindberg’s production before 1888.
However, the question of whether Strindberg anticipated his own 
Nietzscheanism is of little importance here, as this is a question of influ-
ence. My intention is to explicate a dynamic that is common to both 
authorships and my exploration of Strindberg’s production is designed to 
illustrate the relationship of these dynamics to subject construction in the 
initial stages of Strindberg’s autobiographical project. It is also my task to 
name this »Nietzschean« element and show it to be a commonality that 
precedes the encounter between the two men and continues long after 
Strindberg’s »Nietzschean« period had ended. I will now turn to the 
texts. The first point of analysis will be the development of description in 
Strindberg’s authorship and the relationship of this to valuation. This will 
inform us about the compatibility of his naturalism and his »Nietzschean-
ism«.
————
arrest the mutability caused by development. As a result, playwrights have adapted this 
fixed conception of the human being on stage. He then, on pg. 105 offers his own 
alternative for the depiction of »modern« human beings on stage: »Mina själar (karak-
tärer) äro konglomerater av förgångna kulturgrader och pågående bitar ur böcker och 
tidningar, stycken av mänskor, avrivna lappar av helgdagskläder, som blivit lumpor, 
alldeles som själen är hopflikad.« JOHNSON: 1976, 77, provides the following translation: 
»My souls (characters) are conglomerations of past and present cultures, bits out of 
books and of newspapers, pieces of human beings, torn-off shreds of holiday clothes 
that have become rags, exactly as the human soul is put together.«
